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THE ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN
DETERMINING PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
UNITED STATES COURTS
Traditionally, United States courts have not considered United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions to be authoritative sources of
international law, unless the Resolution merely restated legal principles
that could be verified by reference to recognized sources such as
customary international law, treaties, and judicial decisions. Recently,
however, some courts have gone further and have given General
Assembly Resolutions the sam6 weight as full-fledged sources of
international law.I Other courts have refused to take this step and have
preferred to treat Resolutions as mere evidence of international law.2
As litigants invoke international legal principles with increasing
frequency in cases before United States courts, the courts will have to
decide whether General Assembly Resolutions can constitute
authoritative sources of international law.
Beginning with a background summary of the traditional attitude
toward United Nations General Assembly Resolutions as nonbinding
recommendations reflecting idealized international legal principles, this
note reviews the few United States cases in which courts have used the
traditional analysis.3 The note then discusses two major decisions, one
by an international arbitrator and the other by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that advocate a new role for General
Assembly Resolutions as full-fledged sources of international law.4
The note describes the hesitant reaction of courts in the United States
to this departure from tradition and discusses the policy reasons both
for abandoning5 and for preserving6 the traditional, limited role of
General Assembly Resolutions. The note concludes that, although the
Resolutions serve as valuable hortatory evidence of emerging legal
1. See infra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text
4. See infra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
5. See ifrfa notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 90-116 and accompanying text
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principles, they should not constitute independent, authoritative
sources of international law.
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW - THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
International law7 governs dealings between sovereign nations,
which have historically exercised their powers to avoid becoming
bound without their consent.8 To give effective consent, nations must
know what constitutes consent, that is, what action or inaction on their
part will create a binding principle of law. Thus, when a court analyzes
an international legal dispute, it begins with the sources of interna-
tional law by examining the established methods for creating binding
legal principles.9
Four commonly recognized sources of international law have de-
veloped over the centuries from interactions between nations. The
most widely recognized source is custom: principles that have devel-
,oped spontaneously over many years to govern certain recurring inter-
national disputes. Courts usually ascertain custom by engaging in a
detailed historical analysis of many centuries of state practice,' 0 recog-
nizing a customary legal principle when it reflects both a state's uni-
form practice over a long period of time and conscious acceptance of
the principle as law.t" Custom is a reliable source because, by defini-
7. Professor Myres McDougal has underscored the practical importance of knowing what is
,and is not a valid source of international law: sources of international law present "not merely a
theoretical problem, but in actuality a very practical problem. The first question any operating
lawyer would want to know was, 'Who is going to decide my case?'; the second question which
would naturally follow would be, 'Who is making the law.' These were not just theoretical inquir-
ies. Legal norms did not simply exist; they were manifested in a continuous process of evolution
and hence emanated from several different sources." Summary of Discussion. 73 PRoc. OF THE
AM. SOC'Y OF IN'rL L. 327, 327-28 (1979).
8. Cf. RESTATEMENT (REmSED) OF THE FOpRGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
Introductory Note at 15 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (importance of unanimous acceptance of rules
of international law, rather than merely consent of the majority). See generally L. HENKIN, R.
PUGH, 0. SCHACiHER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1-9 (1980)(mod-
em law of nations is intimately connected with the era when sovereign national states dealt with
each other as independent units).
9. In The Paquele Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). the Supreme Court of the United States
demonstrated the classical method for ascertaining international legal principles by analyzing sev-
eral centuries of interactions between individual nations.
10. See, eg., G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E, BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-
27 (6th ed. 1976)(describing how customary principles are ascertained); see also The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. at 686-708 (reviewing five centuries of historical practice before concluding that
customary international law dictates that fishing vessels are exempt from capture as prizes of war).
11. The United States Supreme Court used such an analysis in The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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tion, a custom only exists if it is consistent with state practice.12 Cus-
tom leaves much to be desired, however, because historical analysis
often leaves unresolved many legal details.
Treaties provide the second commonly used source of interna-
tional legal principles.1 3 Because a treaty binds nations that have rati-
fied it, each nation, by its ratification, demonstrates its acceptance of
the legal principle embodied in the treaty. Thus, treaties serve as clear
indicators of the law.
Other commonly recognized sources include judicial decisions and
the teachings of "publicists"-scholars who have written treatises on
"public" international law.14 The category described as "general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized'nations" is also usually included in
lists of sources.' 5 This latter category generally includes legal concepts
common to most domestic legal Systems and serves an interstitial role,
filling the gaps left by treaty and custom.' 6 Principles such as res judi-
cata,pacta sunt servanda (parties must observe their agreements), and
12. See Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations and
the Declaration ofPrincples of Friendly Relations, 137 REcUEIL DES CouRs 419, 482 (1972-Ill)
(describing the elements of the two-part test for custom); accord RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2), § 102(2) comments b, c, reporter's
note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). These authorities expand on the language defining international
custom from the Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, T.S. No. 993.
13. The Restatement lists customary law and treaties as the two principal sources of interna-
tional law. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES Introductory Note at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
14. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993
(listing judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists as sources of international law).
15. The phrase "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" is from the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993. The "general
principles" category is usually read narrowly. See generally Virally, The Sources ofInternational
Law in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 143-48 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968)(explaining cur-
rent interpretations of this peculiar category). The Restatement continues to list "general princi-
ples" as a separate source of international law. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980). The drafters of the
Restatement, however, considered "general principles" to be an independent source of law, sepa-
rate from custom, only when there has not yet been practice by states sufficient to give a particular
principle status as customary law and it has not been legislated by general international agree-
ment. See id comment 1. For example they thought general principles might be helpful in deter-
mining questions of laches, res judicata, estoppel, or rules of fair procedure. See id
"General principles" are not meant to serve as a shortcut to custom; however, some authors
consider the "general principles" category as almost redundant in light of custom. See, e.g.,
Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary
Dywamics of Norm-Creation, II CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 445, 459-60 (198 1)("general principles" are
actually just norms consolidated out of customary practice).
16. See supra note 15.
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jurisdictional rules can derive from this source. 17
Traditional doctrine, developed before the creation of interna-
tional organizations, naturally does not consider the United Nations'
potential role in creating international legal principles. When the
United Nations was founded in 1945, member nations codified the
traditional doctrine for sources of international law when they drafted
the statute governing the authority of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).18 The nations did not intend, however, to expand the traditional
sources to include General Assembly Resolutions. The drafters of the
ICJ Statute rejected a proposal that the Assembly be vested with legis-
lative authority to enact rules of international law. The Philippines
proposed such a role for the General Assembly at the San Francisco
Conference in 1945, but the parties to the conference voted it down by
an overwhelming margin, 19 granting the Assembly only the power to-
recommend and advise.20
17. Accord RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) § 102 comment 1.
18. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38,59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
The UN Charter, article 93, incorporates the ICJ Statute and makes every UN member nation a
party to the treaty establishing the International Court of Justice.
19. See Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 12, at 446-47 ("[I]n so far as the letter of the Charter is
concerned ... while it would be simply naive to look for a provision spelling out the non-binding
character of unqualified General Assembly Resolutions, the relevant Articles do all that is neces-
sary--short of spelling it out in as many words-to exclude the binding character of such resolu-
tions."); see also J. CAsTANEDA, LEGAL EFFEcrs OF UNrrED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 2-3, 197 n.2
(1969)(the drafters of the ICJ Statute knew very well that within the system of the new United
Nations Charter, General Assembly Resolutions would not be binding); RESTATEMENT (REvisED)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 reporter's note (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1980).
20. See U.N. CHARTER art. 10-14. Arangio-Ruiz writes: 'The language of the relevant Arti-
cles of Chapter IV of the Charter (Articles 10-14) is far clearer than some international lawyers
seem ready to admit, in the sense that the general powers granted to the Assembly under those
Articles do not involve binding decision-making except where it is specially so provided expressly
or by implication." Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 12, at 445; Vf. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of
the U.N. General'ssembl, on C stomary IntenuationalLaw, 73 PROC. OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L
L. 301, 301 (1979) (potentially unfair effects of one-state, one-vote procedure were balanced by
giving the General Assembly only recommendatory powers). But see J. Castaneda, supra note 19,
at 8 (U.N. Charter language is equivocal-reasonable doubt exists whether recommendation can
have legal effect).
The official S6viet position is that General Assembly Resolutions bear only recommendatory
character and cannot create legal obligations for member states. See G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-71 (1974). Professor Higgins also considers Article 2(7) of the UN
Charter to be a clause that constrains the General Assembly from exceeding its recommendatory
powers when analyzing international law principles. See general, R. HIGGINS, THE DEvELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 58-
130 (1963). Article 2(7) forbids member states from intervening in matters that are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
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Since 1945, the role of the United Nations has grown dramatically,
and the General Assembly has emerged as a forum for international
dialogue. The General Assembly has adopted many Resolutions con-
cerning international legal principles that members of the Assembly
hoped would serve as normative standards. These declaratory Resolu-
tions cover a wide variety of subjects such as women's rights,21 the right
to be free from torture,22 the right of all people to self-determination, 23
the rights and duties of nations who expropriate foreign-owned assets24
and other controversial issues.25 Resolutions thus address many sensi-
tive areas in which custom, treaties, and other formal sources provide
little guidance about what the international law is.26
II. UNITED STATES COURTS' TREATMENT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESQLUTIONS
United States courts hear very few cases that turn on principles of
international law. The few cases that have arisen since 1945 have occa-
sionally referred to General Assembly Resolutions to support their
conclusions. 27 Whether United States courts are willing to accord sig-.
nificant weight to UN General Assembly Resolutions as legal sources,
however, remains unclear.
21. *See, eg., Declarafion on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 2263,
22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 35, U.N. Doe. A/6716 (1967).
22. See, ,g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/777 (1948).
23. See, eg., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Pco-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514,15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
24. See, eg., Declaration.on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
GA. Res. 3201, Sixth Spec. Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
25. See, eg., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625,25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on the Prohi-
bition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons, G.A Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100, (1961).
26. The Restatement distinguishes between "sources" and "evidence" of international law.
See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF Tm FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 102,
103 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1980). Certainly, General Assembly Resolutions "may stimulate action
towards, or provide an incipient step for the genesis of customary international law." Joyner,
.mpra note 15, at.459. Resolutions may happen to contain principles of international law that
independently meet the criteria for custom. Resolutions may even serve as part (but never all) of
the evidence that convinces a court that nations have created a principle of customary interna-
tional law through their acceptance and practice. But, according to traditional theory, Resolutions
are never custom in and of themselves. Resolutions "are capable, like many other things, of con.
tribuing to the formation of rules of lex commsJr, and can in that sense constitute material
influencing the content of-the law, but not creating it." Fitzmaurice, The Future ofPublic Interna-
tional Law and of the International Legal System in the r Cf nstances of Today, LIvRE DU
CENTENAIRE, 1873-1973 196, 269 (1973Xemphasis in original).
27. See *ztfa text accompanying notes 28-77.
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A. The Early Cases.
Before 1977, the few United States courts that addressed whether
UN General Assembly Resolutions should serve as authoritative
sources of international law largely followed the traditional view that
they should not. The courts did not formally discuss the merits of Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions, but simply declined to give Resolutions any
weight.
For example, in Diggs v. Dent,28 a federal district court faced the
question whether several United Nations Resolutions related to South
Africa's "illegal" occupation of Namibia were enforceable. 29 Instead
of trying to decide the case on the merits, the court held that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case,30 thus successfully sidestep-
ping the issue. In Diggs v. Richardson,31 a similar case involving the
United States' relations with South Africa, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that a claim based on UN Security
Council Resolutions32 was nonjusticiable, declining to decide whether
a Security Council Resolution can create an enforceable international
obligation.33
In these early cases the courts emphasized that United Nations en-
actments under the UN charter, such as UN Security Council Resolu-
tions and the UN Charter itself, are not self-executing and thus are not
28. 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 797 (D.D.C. 1975).
29. See id The plaintiff claimed that "United Nations Resolutions are positive domestic law
and as such are judicially enforceable." Id at 803.
30. Id at 804-05. The court revealed in dictum that it would have considered the issue non-
justiciable even if it had had jurisdiction because it was reluctant to infringe on the executive
branch's power to manage foreign affairs. Id
31. 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
32. Security Council Resolutions are theoretically binding on UN member states. Article 25
of the United Nations Charter provides: "The members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N.
CHARTER art. 25. Thus, Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976), might have been an
appropriate case for a United States court to defer to a UN Resolution in order to honor the
United States' treaty obligation arising from the UN Charter. But see infra note 33.
33. Richardson, 555 F.2d at 850. In case there was any doubt about which authority gov-
erned when there was a clash between Security Council Resolutions and Acts of Congress, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461,465 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). held that Congress was not bound to follow a Security
Council Resolution even though the Resolution took its binding authority directly from the
United Nations Charter (a treaty to which the United States is a party). According to the Scuti
court, Congress could abrogate part of its treaty commitment under the United Nations Charter
and not violate any United States constitutional provisions. Such an action would still constitute a
breach of treaty obligation under international law, for which the United States as a nation would
be liable. The Schutz court did not discuss this issue, however.
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binding on a court in the absence of implementing legislation.3 4 Al-
though these courts did not address whether General Assembly Resolu-
tions bind the states that were party to the enactments, the Dent and
Richardson holdings suggest that most United States courts prefer to
rely on a definitive acceptance of the international principle by a do-
mestic organ such as Congress or the President.
34. See United States v. Vargas, 370 F. Supp. 908, 915 (D.P.R. 1974), rev'don other grounds,
558 F.2d 631 (Ist Cir. 1977) (UN Charter invoked). Moreover, courts have suggested that such
enactments do not in themselves vest individual rights in United States litigants. In Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596,598, 601 n.6 (D.D.C. 1983) the court granted a motion to
dismiss a claim by Nicaraguan plaintiffs seeking damages for "U.S.-sponsored terrorist raids"
against various Nicaraguan towns. Plaintiffi claimed the raids violated fundamental human
rights established under international law and the United States Constitution, citing as authority
numerous Resolutions and treaties including the UN Charter, 59 Stat. 1033 (1945), the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217,3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948), G.A. Res.
191, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 at 188 (1964), the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), and the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons From Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91,
U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975). The court said. "Because we dismiss this lawsuit as nonjusticiable, we
do not decide whether any or all of those sources of international law create a legal foundation for
the relief requested by plaintiffs. Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(torture is a violation of the law ofnations that gives rise to an action for damages in federal court)
wih Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981) (law of nations
or treaties must provide for private rights of action in order for an injured plaintiff to obtain relief
in federal court under alien tort statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350)." See also Diggs v. Richardson, 555
F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Security Council Resolution invoked); Diggs v. Dent, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MATERiALS 797, 804 (D.D.C. 1975)(UN Charter invoked); cf. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534
F.2d 24, 31 (2d. Cir.), cer demed, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) ("law of nations" invoked).
Consider, for example, Judge Friendly's reluctance to recognize as international law one of
the fundamental proscriptions of the Ten Comma-idments. "The reference to the law of nations
must be narrowly read if the section [28 U.S.C. § 1350] is to be kept within the confines of Article
II. We cannot subscribe to plaintiff' view that the Eighth Commandment Thou shalt not steal'
is part of the law of nations." HT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d. Cir. 1975).
Judge Friendly explained that "[w]hile every civilized nation doubtless has this [the
equivalent of the Eighth Commandment] as a part of its legal system, a violation of the law of
nations arises only when there has been 'a violation by one or more individuals of those standards,
rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a for-
eign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.'" Id at
1015 (quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). If United
States courts subscribe to this view, there would be very few cases when a General Assembly
Resolution would have any application in a domestic court, no matter how binding the Resolution
under principles of international law.
Undoubtedly, Judge Friendly was concerned that some sovereign nations might take excep-
tion even to such a fundamental principle as the Eighth Commandment. Given the recent ten-
dency of some countries to expropriate foreign-owned assets within their borders, perhaps Judge
Friendly's solicitude for the rights of other sovereign nations was not as misplaced as it might
otherwise appear.
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B. The Texaco Overseas Arbitration and the Filartiga Decision.
A forceful international arbitration in 1977 prompted United
States courts to address more directly the use of General Assembly
Resolutions. In Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic,35 arbitrator Rene Dupuy, a noted French jurist, tried to determine
what the appropriate standard of compensation should be under inter-
national law36 when a country expropriites foreign-owned assets.
Several General Assembly Resolutions legitimize expropriation
and set a standard for compensation.37 Professor Dupuy decided that
any Resolution commanding the support of "a majority of member
States representing all of the various groups" could serve as a basis for
settling -the dispute.3 8 After engaging in a detailed analysis of the cir-
cumstances surrounding various Resolutions, Professor Dupuy con-
.cluded that General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), which
mandates "appropriate compensation," commanded the necessary sup-
port.39 Professor Dupuy's analysis of various Resolutions is remarka-
bly similar to the process that a court would use to ascertain customary
international law. The important difference, however, is that Dupuy
was examining each country's behavior in the controlled environment
of the United Nations instead of customary behavior in the larger
world arena.4 Thus, even though Dupuy drew on the principles of
35. 17 INT'L LEGAL MATEIUALS 1 (1978).
36. The parties stipulated that international law would govern the dispute. Id at 9.
37. See, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (120 nations voted in favor, six voted
against; ten abstained including the United States, West Germany and Great Britain); Declaration
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S. VI), Sixth Spec.
Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I ) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)(adopted without a vote); Perma-
nent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (108 nations voted in favor, one voted against (Great Britain);
16 abstained including the United States, France, West Germany, and Japan); Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources, GA. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N.
Doc. A/5217 (1962) (87 nations voted in favor, two voted against (France and South Africa);
twelve Soviet Blo nations abstained).
38. See 17 Irr'L LEGAL MARAIAS at 30.
39. Id
40. Professor Dupuy held that "the legal value of the resolutions which are relevant to the
present case can be determined on the basis of circumstances under which they were adopted and
by analysis of the principles which they state." Id Although he had just conceded that "'the
legal value of the declaratory resolutions... includes an immense gamut of nuances,'" Professor
Dupuy asserted that Resolutions, "which proclaim rules recognized by the community of nations
... do not create a custom but confirm one by formulating it and specifying its scope, thereby
making it possible to determine whether or not one is confronted with a legal rule." Id at 29-30
(quotingLa Va/eur des Resolutions des Nations Unies, 129 R.C.A.D.I. 204, 319-20 (1970)). There-
fore, Professor Dupuy concluded that:
on the occasion of the vote on a resolution finding the existence of a customary rule, the
States concerned clearly express their views. The consensus by a majority of states be-
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custom, he departed significantly from the traditional analysis.4'1
In 1980, three years after Texaco Overseas, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,42
also accorded significant weight to UN General Assembly Resolutions.
In Filartiga, a Paraguayan family whose son had been tortured and
killed by officials in.Paraguay brought a wrongful death action against
one of the alleged torturers while he was visiting the United States. To
obtain jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the court had to
find that torture was a violation of international law.43
The FilarUiga court twice suggested that it was using traditional
custom analysis.44 The court stated that, "although there is no univer-
sal agreement as to the precise extent of the 'human rights and funda-
mental freedoms' guaranteed to all [persons] by the [United Nations].
Charter, there is at present no dissent from the view that the guaranties
include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture."45 The
court briefly discussed a host of General Assembly Resolutions, trea-
ties, case decisions, legal essays, and affidavits of international law
scholars to prove that no country claims the right to torture its
citizens.46
The court punctuated its discussion with comments that indirectly
suggest it considered General Assembly Resolutions to be authoritative
sources of international law. For example, the court stated that the
United Nations Charter precepts embodied in the Universal Declara-
longing to the various representative groups indicates without the slightest doubt univer-
sal recognition of the rules therein incorporated.
Id at 30.
41. Professor Dupuy's analysis is built on an argument made eleven years earlier by Judge
Tanaka of the International Court of Justice. n a dissenting opinion to the South West Africa
Cases (Ethiopia v. S. fMr.), 1966 LCJ. 248, 291-93 (Second Phase), Judge Tanaka argued that
when one is trying to prove that a certain customary norm of international law exists, General
Assembly Resolutions can be used as evidence of general practice. Id at 291. Judge Tanaka
suggested that the General Assembly can accelerate the formation of customary law by serving as
a forum in which a state "has the opportunity, through the medium of the organization, to declare
its position to all members of the organization and to know immediately their reaction on the
same matter." Id
Judge Tanaka hoped that by reference to United Nations activities customary principles
could become established in "one generation or even far less than that" Id Judge Tanaka was
nonetheless cautious not to stray too far from the traditional doctrine. He carefully noted that
individual resolutions and declarations cannot have binding force on member nations. Id at 292.
Tosay that General Assembly Resolutions can serve as evidence of incipient custom strains tradi-
tion much less than to say such Resolutions constitute autonomous sources of international law.
Judge Tanaka chose the former view, Professor Dupuy would probably choose the latter.
42. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
43. Id at 880.
44. See id at 881, 884; see also incfa note 57.
45. Id at 882 (emphasis added).
46. Id at 880-85.
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tion of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (III)(A),47
"'constitute basic principles of international law.' ,,48 To support this
point, the court cited General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV),p4 9 and
noted that the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture, General Assembly Resolution 3452,50 was
adopted without dissent.5'
The court also referred to a memorandum from the United Na-
tions Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs suggesting that General As-
sembly Declarations are formal and solemn instruments suitable for
rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are
enunciated.52 The court then returned to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, stating that this Resolution "no longer fits into the di-
chotomy of 'binding treaty' against 'nonbinding pronouncement,' but is
rather an authoritative statement of the international community."5 3
Finally, the court cited several "treaties and accords" as proof of the
international consensus against torture, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution
2200(XXI)(A), 54 and concluded that these enactments proved that tor-
47. G.A. Res. 217 (Iu)(A), 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
48. F1Yar/iga, 630 F.2d at 882 (quoting G.A. Res. 2625).
The Filarliga court's words can also be construed as a fleeting reference to "general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations," an authoritative source of international law different from
custom or treaty. This is an autonomous source listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993. See supra note 15.
49. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA. Res. 2625,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
50. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
51. Filarliga, 630 F.2d at 882-83. The court indicated its view of the significance of this
Resolution by reproducing it in its entirety in a footnote. See id at 882 n.l.
52. Id at 883.
53. Filariga, 630 F.2d at 883 (quoting E. ScnwELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMUNITY 70 (1964)) (emphasis added).
54. Id at 883-84. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI)(A), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) is both a Resolution
and a multilateral treaty. It entered into force as a treaty on March 23, 1976. The United States
and 106 other nations voted for this Covenant as a Resolution. No country voted against the
Resolution, nor did any country abstain. But sixteen countries were absent at the time of the vote,
including Uganda and South Africa. See XI UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 51 (D. Djonovich
ed. 1975). President Carter signed the Covenant in its treaty form in 1977, but, as of September
1983, the Senate has not ratified it. As of December 31, 1981, 69 countries had ratified the Cove-
nant. The United States and Paraguay, the two countries of concern in the Fdariga case, were
notably absent from the list of ratifying nations. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General 117, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/l (1982).
The Alartiga court cited two other treaties as evidence of the international consensus against
torture: the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 OAS Treaty Series No. 36,
-OAS OFF. REc. OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Cor. 1, reprinted in 9 hNr'L LEGAL
MATERiALS 99 (1970), and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
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ture violates international law.55
The numerous instances in which the Filartiga court cited General
Assembly Resolutions as authority make clear the court's implicit hold-
ing that these Resolutions constitute authoritative sources of interna-
tional law. The court did not engage in any detailed historical analysis
to see whether actual state practice would support the court's conclu-
sion that torture violates international law.56 Thus, the court did not
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 1950 EUROPEAN T. S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953). In citing these treaties the court merely paraphrased the authorities cited
by an international law professor whose affidavit had been used to support Filartiga's complaint.
See Affidavit of Richard B. Lillich at 3, Exhibit E, Affidavit of International Law Experts, Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)(on file in Second Circuit library).
Despite the court's reference to these treaties, the court made little pretense of resting its
holding on treaty law. The court acknowledged quite early that the Filartiga family had not
contended their action arose directly under a treaty of the United States. See Fiar.iga, 630 F.2d at
880 n.7 and accompanying text. Although both the United States and Paraguay have ratified the
UN Charter, the Charter's statements on human rights are much too ambiguous to have supported
the court's holding. Thus, by default, General Assembly Resolutions appear to be the "authorita-
tive source" of international law on which the Filariga court relied.
55. i 7laraga, 630 F.2d at 883-84. There are two reasons, independent of the merits of the
legal issues presented in the case, why the court may have held for the appellant (torture victim's
family) in rFdWaga. First, the egregious human rights violations may have prompted the court to
take an expansive view of international law. Second, the court may have found for the appellant
in this case simply because the appellee (alleged torturer) was poorly represented by counsel.
Counsel for the appellee actually conceded the following point: "plaintiffs' allegations that con-
temporary international law condemns torture, are, and remain, uncontradicted.... Since the
testimony in support of that allegation of fact was not clearly insubstantial, the character of the
norms of contemporary international law. . . must be tak'-n as alleged by plaintiffs." Movants'
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion of Amnesty International at 4-5, as quoted in
Appellants Reply Brief at 2, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (on fie in Second
Circuit library).
Counsel for the appellee chose to argue only that conduct that did not affect the relationship
between states, or between an individual and a foreign state, could not be a violation of interna-
tional law. See Appellee's Brief at 11-15, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (on
file in Second Circuit library). The trial court dismissed the case on the basis of this argument.
See Memorandum and Order at 3-4, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-C-917 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,
1979Xon file in Second Circuit library).
In contrast to the appellee's virtual concession on the point, the appellants had substantial
support, in the form of affidavits from several law professors, for the proposition that torture
constitutes a violation of international law. See, ag., Affidavit of Myres S. McDougal (the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
both proscribe torture and have become customary international law); Affidavit of Richard B.
Lillich (various resolutions, and treaties that the United States has not ratified, reflect the emer-
gence of a norm of customary international law condemning torture); Affidavit of Richard A. Falk
(a consensus of states can generate new norms of customary international law through the formal
procedures of the United Nations). These affidavits are part of Exhibit E, Affidavits of Interna-
tional Law Experts, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-C-917 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)(on file in Second Cir-
cuit library).
56. See Fizamiga, 630 F.2d at 881, 884.
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rest its decision on bona fide customary legal principles.57 Moreover,
its decision could not have been based on treaty law because neither
the United States nor Paraguay have ratified the treaties that the Filar-
riga court cited.58
57. In fact, the court was not employing traditional custom analysis at all. Throughout its
opinion, the Filartiga court applied a relaxed standard for proof of customary international law,
asserting that a principle must only "command the general assent of civilized nations to become
binding.' Id at 881. The court borrowed this phrase from The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
694 (1900), but took it out of context. In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court engaged in
over twenty pages of analysis-spanning five centuries of history--to ascertain a principle of cus-
tomary law. The Supreme Court's exhaustive analysis revealed far more than whether the princi-
ple in question commanded "the general assent of civilized nations."
The standard for custom in the International Court of Justice Statute is also much more
rigorous than Filartiga's standard. The ICJ recognizes customary international law when it is
"evidence of a general practice accepted as law." See Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, Article 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. 993. This two-part test requires both the gen-
eral practice of nations, which one authority says must be diiurnits-that is, uniform behavior
for some time-as well as acceptance as law or opinio juris. See Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative
Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Princioles of Friendly
Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES Couis 419,482 (1972-II); accord RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) comments b, c and reporters' note 2
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
The Filartiga court unwittingly demonstrated several times that it was not applying the same
rigorous standard for ascertaining custom that the Supreme Court and International Court of
Justice would use. The Filartiga court casually brushed over the problem that although many
countries condemn torture with their words, they continue to practice it with their deeds. See
Filartiga; 630 F.2d at 884 n.15. The court's weak explanation for this defect in its argument was
that "states often violate international law, just as individuals often violate municipal law." Id
Such a comment flies in the face of fundamental requirements for proof of custom. Yet this lax
attitude toward custom even appeared in the court's summary of its holding. The court said that
virtually all the nations of the world had renounced torture as an instrument of official policy 'm
principle if not in practice." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (emphasis added). This remark bluntly
contradicts the all-important requirement for customary principles of consistentpractice by most,
if not all, nations. The court demonstrated with this statement that it was paying attention to what
nations say rather than what they do. The court used similar language later in the opinion, where
it said it had little difficulty discerning universal renunciation of torture in the modern usage and
practice of nations. Id at 883.
58. See supra note 54.
Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State, described the legal arguments in the Filartiga opinion
as a "gossamer web of authority." Rusk, A Comment on Filariga v. Pena-Irala, II GA. J. INT'L &
COMe. L. 311, 312 (1981). He added that: "The ghosts of many a common law judge would nod
approvingly." Id at 311. Rusk anticipated that the Filartiga decision is "likely to find its place as
a legal oddity picked up in 'but see . .' footnotes by diligent scholars." Id
The Filartiga decision prompted a flurry of legal commentary. In particular, commentators
were highly critical of the court's new, expansive reading of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1976), as providing federal court jurisdiction over international human rights claims. See,
e.g., Judicial Decision, Jurisdiction4-Alien Tort Statute--Iether Torture Constitutes a Tort in
Violation of International Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 149 (1981); Symposium-Federal Jurisdiction,
Human Rights, and the Law of Nations: Essays on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 305 (1981); Blum and Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights
- Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L LJ. 53 (1981);
Case Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation ofInternationalLaw, 33 STAN. L REv. 353 (1981);
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C. Cases Since Filartiga and Texaco Overseas.
Since Filartiga, several courts have implicitly adopted the Filartiga
court's expansive use of General Assembly Resolutions as full-fledged
sources of international law.5 9 Other courts, however, including a
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, have ignored the
Filarliga court's holding and have continued to disregard UN General
Assembly Resolutions as authoritative statements of the law.60 In Fer-
nandez v. Wilkinson,61 the case adopting most closely the Filartiga posi-
tion, a Cuban refugee who was being held in federal prison pending
deportation filed a habeas corpus claim. The federal district court
made an elaborate and far-reaching argument in support of construing
General Assembly Resolutions as sources of international law62 and
used Resolutions to support its conclusion that indefinite imprisonment
of a refugee violates international law.63 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision,64 but it is unclear whether the
Court of Appeals endorsed the district court's international law argu-
ments, because the appellate decision rests primarily on domestic law.65
Several other cases manifest some support for the Filariga posi-
tion by their use of General Assembly Resolutions. 66 In Iafarl v. Is-
Note, Enforcement of International Human Rights in the Federal Courts After Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 67 VA. L. Rav. 1379 (1981). This note concentrates on a different aspect of the Filartlga
holding: its reliance on General Assembly Resolutions as a source of international law.
59. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
60. See hy 'a notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
61. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), e'd, Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d
1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
62. See id at 797-98.
63. Id at 798. The district court apparently believed it could play a part in advancing
human rights by making international law applicable in an area-human rights--in which Con-
gress has repeatedly declined to do so:
The United States... is signatory to very few international human rights agreements
and ratifying state to even fewer such agreements. Moreover, a strong argument can be
made that the United States does not follow even the spirit of some of the international
human rights agreements to which it is a party. Instead, other concerns--economic,
political, and social--assume preeminence to the detriment of human rights on an inter-
national scale.
Id at 799 (quoting Stotzsky, Book Commentary, 11 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 229, 240 (1979)-
mistakenly cited as I1 MIA 3. INT'L L.).
64. See Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
65. The majority opinion in Widkinson made abbreviated references to many of the same
principles that the district court relied on, thus implying that the decision may have had some
basis in international law. But the dissenting judge suggested the contrary: "Like the majority of
the panel, I agree that the present controversy should be resolved on the basis of domestic law, as
opposed to international law, which was the basis for the trial court's release order." ikinson,
654 F.2d at 1390 (McWidliams, J, dissenting).
66. In Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), mo&.fiedon other grounds, 651
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981), the court applied Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
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lamic Republic of Iran,67 a case involving the Ayatollah Khomeini's
expropriation of foreign-owned property, the court dismissed a claim
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act 68 and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.69 The court cited Filartiga for the proposition that a
practice violates international law when it is "so universally abhorred
that its prohibition commands the 'general assent of civilized na-
tions.' -70 Although the court apparently accepted Filartiga's permis-
sive standard for ascertaining principles of international law, it
dismissed the claim on the ground that "commercial violations... do
not constitute breaches of international law."71
The strongest case opposing Filartiga's position on General As-
sembly Resolutions was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit approximately one year after the Second Circuit's Filartiga
decision. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,72 the
court decided an expropriation dispute between an American bank and
the state bank of Cuba. The court considered the same General As-
sembly Resolutions that the Texaco Overseas arbitrator had analyzed
in 1977 73 but reached the opposite conclusion. The court held that the
Resolutions do not correctly reflect international law because they
mandate "appropriate compensation" for expropriated property
whereas the United States has always advocated the standard of
developed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council under the mandate of the United
Nations Charter. Citing Filartiga, the court found that the Minimum Standards,
may be significant as expressions of the obligations to the international community..
and as part of the body of international law (including customary international law)
concerning human rights which has been built upon the foundation of the United Na-
tions Charter.
Id at 1188 n.9. The Lareau court asserted that Filariga supported the proposition that the UN
"Charter's provisions on human rights are evidence of principles of customary international law
recognized as part of the law of the United States." Id at 1188.
The following year, in Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982), a dissenting judge urged that forcing a soldier to participate in a
radiation test violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several other United Na-
tions Declarations. Seeid at 1249. The dissenting judge reached the inexplicable conclusion that
because such conauct violated international legal principles, it also violated the Constitution and
the laws of the United States.
67. 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill 1982).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1976).
70. Jafari, 539 F. Supp. at 215.
71. Id Ironically, the court would have found that Iran lacked sovereign immunity _under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act only if a commercial activity had been at issue. See id at
210.
72. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981). None of the judges who decided Banco Nacionalde Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank sat on the FIdartiga panel.
73. See supra note 37.
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"prompt, adequate and effective compensation." 74 The court engaged
in conventional custom analysis to reach this result, noting that Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions "are of considerable interest" but that they
"do not have the force of law.""5 It observed that "the actions of mem-
bers of the General Assembly [present] at best a confused and confus-
ing picture as to what the consensus may be as to the responsibilities of
an expropriating nation to pay 'appropriate compensation.' 76 The
court added that "[t]he resolutions, the views of commentators, and the
positions taken by individual states or blocs are varied, diverse, and not
easily reconciled."77
HI. THE ARGUmENT FOR UsING GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The suggestion that UN Gbneral Assembly Resolutions should
serve as an authoritative source of international law originated almost
exclusively with legal scholars. The arguments in favor of Resolutions
serving as an authoritative source of law can be roughly divided into
three categories.
First, some scholars assert that because General Assembly Resolu-
tions derive their authority from the UN Charter-a treaty binding on
all UN members-any Resolution concerning subjects addressed by
the Charter has the authority of the Charter itself. The UN Charter
74. Banco Nacona, 658 F.2d at 889, 891. The court held that the General Assembly's term
"appropriate compensation" must be construed to mean "full compensation" because the United
States delegation consistently favored the latter standard.
75. Id at 889.
76. Id at 891.
77. Id
Several other recent cases also follow the traditional doctrine and reject General Assembly
Resolutions as authoritative legal sources. In Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.
Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), a case involving a terrorist bombing, the court could have cited a variety
of General Assembly Resolutions to establish a violation of international law, such as Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A. Res. 217 (I), 3 U.N. GAOR. U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948)
(guarantees all persons the right to life, liberty and security). Instead, the court distinguished
Fiarliga and held that it lacked jurisdiction because there was no violation of international law.
Hanoch Td-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549. The court added that "'to interpret international human
rights law to create a federal private right of action overstates the level of agreement among na-
tions on remedies for human rights violations." Id at 549 (quoting Note, Torture as a Tori in
iolation ofInteronafanl La. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 STAN. L. Rv. 353, 357 (1981)).
In Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of the United States, Inc. v. Mabey,
19 Bankr. 635 (D. Utah 1982), the court rejected the novel argument that a bankruptcy judge
violated international law when he failed to recuse himself from cases in which he had a possible
conflict of interest. Responding to plaintiff's citation of a number of General Assembly Resolu-
tions and similar international authorities, id at 646, the court stated that "[ulnless or until ratified
as treaties, those documents at best serve as evidence of international 'common law,' or customary
law." Id at 647 (emphasis added).
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addresses many topics other than organizational details for the various
bodies comprising the UN. These topics include self-determination,
equal rights, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and economic
cooperation.7 8 Thus, the first approach grants the General Assembly
broad powers. Jorge Castaneda, a Mexican diplomat, has argued that
because there is no body competent to judge the scope of the General
Assembly's authority other than the Assembly itself, the General As-
sembly's powers can evolve organically to meet new circumstances.79
Thus, through its repeated efforts to declare principles of international
law that concern subjects discussed in the UN Charter, the General
Assembly may have secured additional powers beyond the recom-
mendatory powers listed in the UN Charter.80 This view has also ap-
pealed to some Soviet scholars, although they distinguish between
"binding rules of law" and "sources" and call Resolutions the former.8 I
A second group of scholars suggests that General Assembly Reso-
lutions can replace certain elements needed to prove custom or serve.as
a substitute for any extrinsic proof of custom. Three law professors
filed affidavits in the Filartiga case consistent with this view.82 Profes-
sor Myres McDougal argued that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and associated covenants on human rights have "become cus-
78. See, eg., U.N. CHARTm art. 55, 56, 73.
79. See J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 15-16 (1969); see
also R. HIGGIN S supra note 20, at 118-19; Schachter, 1he Relation ofLaw, Politics andAction in the
United Nations, 109 RECUEIL DES COURS 186 (1963-I).
Schachter reveals a flaw in Castaneda's argument. The San Francisco Conference said that if
an interpretation of the Charter is not generally acceptable, it will be without binding force. See
i at 186 n.4. In discerning whether a Resolution is generally acceptable a court has two choices.
First, it could look at which countries voted for the Resolution and infer consensus from that. But
that would be circular-every Resolution that passed the General Assembly would be "generally
acceptable," and the qualification made at the San Francisco conference would be reduced to
mere surplusage. Alternatively, a court could investigate both the general practice and the pro-
nouncements of nations. But this analysis merely repeats the analysis used to determine whether
an international custom exists. If a court must first apply the "custom analysis" to verify that the
Resolution is "generally acceptable," it is misleading to declare the Resolution an authoritative
statement of the law. Accord G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 171-73 (1974);
Schwebel, The Effects of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International
Law, 73 PROC. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 303-05 (1979). Some housekeeping Resolutions
dealing with internal UN affairs, however, do have a binding effect under the Charter. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 15-22; J. CASTANEDA, LEOAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 23
(1969) (four-fifths of General Assembly Resolutions are housekeeping Resolutions).
80. Cf Wilner, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala : Comments on Sources of Human Rights Law and
Means of Redressfor Violations of Human Rights, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COME. L. 317, 321-22 (1981)
(emphasizing possible value of universal international legislative organ).
81. See Osakwe, Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on the Sources of General International Law,
73 PROC. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 310, 320 (1979).
82. These affidavits are part of Exhibit E, Affidavits of International Law Experts, Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-C-917 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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tomary international law and thus a part of the Law of Nations." 3
Professor Richard Lillich argued that Resolutions can reflect the emer-
gence of a customary norm,8 and Professor Richard Falk asserted that
a consensus of states can generate new norms of customary interna-
tional law through the formal procedures of the United Nations. 85
Some scholars have even gone so far as to speak of "instant custom,"
resulting from UN action.86 It is arguable that this group of scholars
would only incorporate Resolutions into the existing source of custom,
but the practical effect would nonetheless be to treat General Assembly
Resolutions as a separate authoritative source.
Proponents of the third approach argue that General Assembly
Resolutions have inherent authority.as normative standards adopted by
an international body speaking for all of its members. These argu-
ments vary considerably. Some argue that a nation's declarations to'
the international community create an expectation that the state will'
adhere to the principles it declares.87 Proponents of this argument
would probably contend that if nations create such expectations, it is
not unreasonable to treat their statements as law. A group of Soviet
scholars has suggested that when Resolutions are consistent withtis
cogens (peremptory norms) the Resolutions can serve as sources of in-
ternational law.88 Still other commentators would defer to the "inter-
national rules of the road" established by the General Assembly
whenever states use language of firm obligation in UN Resolutions or
Declarations because such language indicates that states intend to as-
sert binding rules of law.89
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST USE OF RESOLUTIONS AS
A SOURCE OF LAW
Despite scholars' suggestions that the General Assembly can now
play a direct role in the formation of international law, United States
courts should continue to refrain from treating General Assembly Res-
83. See Affidavit of Myres S. McDougal, included in Exhibit E, supra note 55 (referring to
his book HUmAN RIGHTs AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDR (1980)).
84. See Affidavit of Richard B. Lillich at 4, included in Exhibit E, supra note 55.
85. See Affidavit of Richard Anderson Falk at 2, included in Exhibit E, jupra note 55.
86. See, ag., Joyner, U.N. GeneralAssembl, Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking
the Contemporary D)zamcs of Norm-Creanon, 11 CAL. W.L. Rnv. 445, 458 (1981).
87. See, ,"g., Note, Towrd an International Law of Hwnan Rights Based Upon the Mutual
Expectations of States, 21 VA. L INr'L L. 185, 205 (1980).
88. See Osakwe, Conemporary Soviet Doctrine on the Sources of General International Law,
73 PROC. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INTL L. 310, 321 (1979).
89. See Rosenstock, The Decharation of Princoles of International Law Concerning Frendy
Relationr A Survey, 65 AM. . IN'L L. 713, 715-16 (1971).
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olutions as authoritative sources of international law.90 First, General
Assembly Resolutions are inadequate as legal sources because they fre-
quently contradict each other or are too vaguely stated to be applied as
law. For example, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803
(XVII) of December 14, 1962, authorizes states to nationalize, expropri-
ate or requisition property and override private interests for the sake of
the public interest.91 Yet the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Article 17) provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property. 92 The legal rules that could be derived from these two Reso-
lutions, if read together, would reflect the predisposition of the inter-
preting court at least as much as the intention of the General Assembly.
Consider the Filartiga problem in this light. A General Assembly
Resolution declares that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment or punishment are an offense to human dignity and
should be condemned.93 In a case in which the alleged torture is not as
egregious as it was in Filartiga, how is a United States court going to
determine whether certain activity falls within this proscription? In
other circumstances, would the British treatment of imprisoned mem-
90. Many scholars also advocate this view. For example, Georg Schwarzenberger rejected
General Assembly Resolutions as authoritative legal sources in his MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw:
The General Assembly has the right to dircur any matter within its jurisdiction. Save in
relation to disputes or situations of which the Security Council is seized, the General
Assembly may also make recommendations .... Whatever political or moral force
such recommendations of the General Assembly may claim, they are not legally binding.
G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 233 (6th ed. 1976)
(emphasis in original); accord Virally, 7Te Sources of International Law in MANUAL OF PUBuC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
Many prominent legal scholars adhere to this view. See, ag., R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 5
(1963) (Resolutions are notper se binding although they may embody rules which are binding,
with or without the help of the Resolution); G. TuNit., THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 173
(1974) (Resolutions are recommendations and do not impose legal obligations on UN members);
Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4
(1976)(virtually all governments have affirmed the general proposition that General Assembly
Resolutions are not legally binding except, of course, on internal UN matters); Schwebel, The
Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 PROC. OF
THE AM. SOC'Y OF ITr'L L. 301 (1979XGeneral Assembly lacks legislative powers-Resolutions
are not binding on member states or in international law at large).
91. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962).
92. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N.
'Doc. 1/777 (1948).
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice highlighted this contradiction between Resolution 1803 and Resolu-
tion 217 in Fitzmaurice, The Future of Public International Law and of the International Legal
System in the Circumstances of Today, LvRE DU CENTENAIRE, 1873-1973 196, 229-30 (1973).
93. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture, G.A.
Res. 3452, art. 2,30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
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bers of the Irish Republican Army qualify as torture by UN standards?
Would capital punishment in the United States be proscribed by this
language? The language of the Resolution, taken in isolation, cannot
provide an answer without reference to other sources of international
law.
Second, and most importantly, General Assembly Resolutions are
unreliable indicators of world opinion. When courts use General As-
sembly Resolutions as authoritative sources of international law, they
undermine the rigorous requirements of custom by accepting in place
of these requirements a lax standard for proof of legal principles. In
effect, courts eliminate the requirement of actual state practice and in-
stead accept weaker proof that states have intended a given principle to
be legally binding.
Although under some circumstances General Assembly Resolu-
tions accurately reflect international law, often they do not.94 Some,
Resolutions receive a unanimous vote, some are adopted without any
vote, and others are passed by an overwhelming margin but not sup-
ported by certain blocs of countries. A court might devise an elaborate
formula for determining which Resolutions are sufficiently credible to
serve as sources of binding international law. But to do so conscien-
tiously it would repeat much of the analysis used to determine whether
a principle qualifies as international custom. 95 Thus, use of Resolu-
94. Arangio-Ruiz describes how law can carelessly emerge from the General Assembly:
As everybody in the United Nations is convinced that recommendations areper se not
mandatory, States tend to embellish their image by putting forward draft resolutions.
Other States tend naturally to support such drafts. And potential or natural opponents
are often reluctant to face the risk of tarnishing or spoiling their own image by opposing
the proposal openly or by casting a negative vote.
Arangto-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Arsemby of the United Nations and the Declara-
lions of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 RCUBIL DES Coups 419, 457 (1972-III). Garibaldi
called this "fake agreement." Garibaldi, The Legal Status of GeneralAsrembly Resolutions.: Some
Conceptual Observations, 73 PRoc. OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L 324, 326 (1979).
95. Consider, for example, a United States court trying to decide whether international law
forbids a country from claiming exclusive rights to mine a certain section of the deep sea-bed. In
1968, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2467 (XXIII), titled "Examina-
tion of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national
jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind." 23 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 18), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). One hundred and twelve nations, including the United States,
out of 119, voted for provision (A) of this Resolution which states: "The General Assembly [is]
convinced that such exploitation should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
irrespective of the geographical location of States, taking into account the special interests and
needs of the developing countries." XII UN=rr NATIONs REsOLuTONS 66, 129 (D. Djonovich
ed. 1975).
There is simply no way to tell from the text of the Resolution and the split voting record on
various other clauses of the Resolution dealing with marine pollution, id at 130, and the use of
"international machinery" to promote exploitation of sea-bed resources, id at 67, 130, whether the
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tions as sources of international law is not faithful to the original con-
cern of nations in developing international law that as sovereign
nations they cannot be bound without their consent.96
In Texaco Overseas97 the arbitrator ascertained a dramatically dif-
ferent legal rule because he used General Assembly Resolutions, in-
stead of custom, as a source of international law. In Texaco Overseas
the arbitrator used General Assembly Resolutions as a shortcut to as-
certaining the international legal standard for reimbursement following
expropriation of foreign assets. Instead of analyzing past state practice
"exploitation for the benefit of mankind" principle reflects current international law. Provision
(A) suggests that mining countries must take into account the needs of developing countries, a
principle which seems to be at odds with exclusive rights. Without the familiar tools used to
ascertain customary international law there is simply no way to know which principle accurately
reflects the law on this subject.
In fact, recent developments suggest that this Resolution may not express the current view.
The United States has chosen not to sign the Third Law of the Sea Treaty, which might have
governed the situation, precisely because its provisions on sea-bed mining reflected the same con-
cers as the General Assembly Resolution. See New York Times, Dec. I1, 1982, at 1, col. 2. Thus
a court would not discover that this Resolution, which commanded widespread support at the
time of passage, may be contrary to custom until it engages in the custom analysis.
96. Multilateral treaties that set forth legal principles are the safest mechanism for avoiding
affronts to sovereignty. Most multilateral treaties originate in the United Nations. Many are the
result of work by the U.N. International Law Commission- The Restatement uses this method as
one illustration of how international law is formed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 comment d, illustration 2 (1962) (International
Law Commission refers draft convention to the General Assembly; General Assembly recom-
mends adoption and convenes a conference of states to sign and ratify the convention).
Unlike General Assembly Resolutions, multilateral treaties are meant to be binding. Each
country that joins a treaty accepts that binding obligation when it joins the treaty. As a result, the
codification of international law through the vehicle of treaties has been a slow process. Consider,
for example, how long it has taken for the International Law Commission to develop the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27. The Commission
started work in 1949 and eventually produced a draft convention in 1969. The treaty entered into
force on January 27, 1980. The United States still has not ratified the treaty. See Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General 619, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/l (1982).
Multilateral treaties have met with substantial success on some issues such as the law gov-
erning treaty obligations and the use of outer space. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, (1969), 63 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 875 (1969) (entered into
force January 27,: 1980); Treaty on Princioles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347,610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force October 10, 1967). Multilat-
eral treaties have met with some setbacks on other more controversial issues, such as the Law of
the Sea. The Third Law of the Sea Treaty was signed by 117 nations in December 1982. The
United States did not sign it because it objects to certain sea-bed mining provisions. See New
York Times, Dec. 11, 1982, at 1, col 2. On extremely controversial issues such as human rights
and redistribution of economic wealth, multilateral treaties may not even be a viable option. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, id at 49. The United States Congress has never ratified either of these
treaties.
97. 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1978).
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in expropriation disputes, the arbitrator analyzed the voting patterns
for various Resolutions. 98 The arbitrator concluded that one Resolu-
tion that mandated "appropriate compensation" reflected the law be-'
cause the Resolution appeared to have garnered support from all the
major blocs of nations.99 Yet when a United States court employed the
rigorous requirements of custom analysis in considering the same ques-
tion a few years later in Eanco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,10° it found no consensus on what should be the proper standard
for reimbursement following expropriation.101
The Filart'ga court, like the Texaco Overseas arbitrator, used Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions as a shortcut to establishing principles of
international law. 10 This method of analysis fails to consider the sov-
ereignty of individual states. If General Assembly Resolutions can be
considered law even though they do not meet the rigorous standards
for custom, then there is a risk of binding a state to principles that it has
never accepted as law, A United States court should not treat General
Assembly Resolutions as an authoritative legal source without employ-
ing the traditional method for determining whether international cus-
tom exists and looking for a willingness on the part of each nation to be
bound. Many UN member nations would not consent to be bound by
the legal principles embodied in certain Resolutions even if the Resolu-
tions were adopted by a majority or unanimous vote. 10 3
Some observers have suggested that United States courts could re-
gard as binding any Resolution for which the United States voted.
They suggest that the United States delegation would vote carefully if
courts accorded such weight to its vote. Yet even this stipulation would
not serve as a sufficient safeguard. The United States sometimes votes
for Resolutions to win favor with its Third World allies even though
98. Id at 28. The Texaco Oversear arbitrator provided some explanation of his methodol.
ogy. He said,
it appears essential to this Tribunal to distinguish between those provisions [of Resolu-
tions] stating the existence of a right on which the generality of the States has expressed
agreement and those provisions introducing new principles which were rejected by cer-
tain representative groups of States and having nothing more than a de legeferenda
value only in the eyes of the States which have adopted them; as far as the others are
concerned, the rejection of these same principles implies that they consider them as being
contra legem.
99. Id at 30.
100. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
101. Id at 891-92.
102. See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
103. Accord Rusk,A Comment on FPdartiga . Pena-Irala, I I GA. I IN'L & CoMP. L. 311, 315
(1981) ("There are members who simply would not submit to a fundamental change in the role of
the General Assembly by stealth.").
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the Resolutions reflect views contrary to United States interests.1 4
Thus, even if only unanimous Resolutions are accepted as law, there is
a potential for abuse.'05 One author calls this "fake consensus"' 0 6
The Banco Nacional case illustrates the kind of situation in which
a United States court would not want to be bound by the United Na-
tions General Assembly's determination of international law. The
General Assembly's standard for compensation following expropria-
tion would have entailed substantial losses for American investors who
held assets in pre-Castro Cuba.'0 7
The Cuban state bank argued in Banco Nacional that the court
should follow General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), a Resolution
that mandated "appropriate compensation" following expropriation. 08
The United States had opposed this provision and advocated an alter-
native standard of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. °9
But the United States ultimately voted in favor of Resolution 1803 in a
spirit of compromise." 0 The Banco Nacional de Cuba court did not
treat the Resolution as an authoritative statement of the law because
the court recognized that the majority vote in favor of Resolution 1803
masked considerable discord over what the precise legal standard
104. Frequently, the United States representative to the United Nations casts his vote to ac-
commodate other nations rather than to manifest a wholehearted United States endorsement of
the measure. The Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department has candidly described this
practice:
[Members of the UN] often vote casually: their delegates may be instructed or loosely
instructed; they may vote because the members of their group have decided or are dis-
posed so to vote rather than because the immediate interests or considered views of their
government so suggest. The members of the General Assembly typically vote in re-
sponse to political not legal considerations. They do not conceive of themselves as creat-
ing or changing international law. It normally is not their intention to affect
international law but to make the point which the resolution makes. The issue often is
one of image rather than international law: states will vote a given way repeatedly not
because they consider that their reiterated votes are evidence of a practice accepted as
law but because it is politically unpopular to vote otherwise.
Schwebel, supra note 20, at 302. From this description of UN practice, Schwebel concludes that:
"states often don't meaningfully support what a resolution says and they almost always do not
mean that the resolution is law. This may be as true or truer in the case of unanimously adopted
resolutions as in the case of majority-adopted resolutions. It may be truer still of resolutions
adopted by 'consensus.'" Id; cf REsTATEMENT (REVIs D) OF THE FORmGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES, Introductory Note at 15 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (consensus votes discour-
age dissent and put pressure on dissident states to acquiesce).
105. See Summary of Dixcusion, 73 PROC. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 327, 332
(1979)(comments by State Dept. representative Schwebel on how casually countries vote in the
United Nations General Assembly).
106. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. GeneralAssembly on Customary Interna-
tional Law, 73 PRoc. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INr'L L. 301, 308 (1979).
107. See Banco National, 658 F.2d at 892.
108. See id
109. See id at 888-89.
110. See id at 890.
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should be."' Yet if a court looked only to the voting pattern in the
United Nations, as did the Texaco Overseas arbitrator, it would never
get beyond the Resolution to see what nations actually believed when
their economic interests were at stake.
This caveat applies with even greater force to Resolutions that did
not secure a unanimous or near-unanimous vote. The so-called Group
of 77 developing countries, which now numbers approximately 120
countries out of 154,112 is able to garner a two-thirds vote on a "law-
declaring" Resolution without much difficulty. Thus, many Resolu-
tions command an overwhelming majority in the United Nations even
though they lack the support of any industrialized nations. 113 Al-
though a system under which General Assembly Resolutions are au-
thoritative legal sources would ensure that developing countries
participated in the formulation of international law, 14 there is a sub-
stantial risk that developing countries could use the process to impose
their economic and political interests on nations such as the United
States.
The nations of the world have not yet reached the point where
they will entrust their legal rights to an assembly founded on the one-
nation, one-vote principle."Is Until nations expressly agree to give the
General Assembly more than mere recommendatory powers, United
States courts should refrain from attributing special authority to Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions. 116
V. CONCLUSION
For the time being, United States courts should continue to refuse
to treat General Assembly Resolutions as authoritative sources of inter-
national law. This is not because the traditional sources are superior in
Ill. See id at 890.
112. See Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutionw and International Law: Rethiking the
Contemporary D mlcs ofNorm-Creation, 11 CAI- W.L. REv. 445, 445 (1981).
113. Professor Rusk commented on this prospect as follows: "Nations representing less than
ten percent of the world's population can now cast a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly."
See Rusk, supra note 103, at 315.
114. See L. HENKIN, P. PUGH, 0. ScH-cHTFr-a & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERLms 691-92 (1980) (comments of Messrs. Nervo and Tunkin regarding desirability of de-
veloping countries' future participation in formulation and codification of international law).
115. This generalization about one-nation, one-vote ignores the substantial voting bloc of So-
viet-controlled states.
116. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice expressed disdain for the present situation in which "Assembly
resolutions do not constitute law, but legal ideas are stretched and legal principle itself warped in
the vain endeavour to make them appear [as law]." Fitzmaurice, The Future ofPublic Interna.
tional Law and of the International Legal System in the Circumtances of Today, LivRE Du
CENTENAIRE, 1873-1973 196, 275 (1973). He added- "It is not by such means that the 'mirage'
will be given genuine substance, but by a much more painful discipline." Id
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every respect. They are not. Instead, it is because General Assembly
Resolutions remain too unreliable to regard as definitive sources. The
United Nations General Assembly has remained a political body en-
dowed with the advantages of open and uninhibited discussion. It
serves a valuable function as a forum for the expression of momentary
indignation and deeply held sentiments. But its strengths as an interna-
tional political body are also its weaknesses as a legislative body. If
member nations knew they would be bound by their votes, many Reso-
lutions would never be passed, and the General Assembly's unique
function as the voice of world opinion would be undermined.
Without General Assembly Resolutions as authoritative sources,
principles of international law will continue to be difficult to ascertain.
The four traditional sources of international law require more than cas-
ual examination before they will yield principles on which to found an
adjudication of rights. Judicial decisions on international law are in-
frequent. Writings of publicists on most issues rarely suggest a uniform
result. Principles of customary international law depend on the amor-
phous variables of each nation's practice and the world community's
acceptance as law of a given principle. General Assembly Resolutions
can contribute to a determination of a particular custom as long as
these Resolutions -are considered evidence, and not complete proof, of
the principles they support.' 17
Gregory .Kerwin
117. An expansive view of the sources of international law may "seem handy, when a specific
point we want to make finds support in a General Assembly resolution, but we may find that after
using his services it may be impossibl--and intellectually dishonest--to put the genie back into
the bottle." Garibaldi, The LegalStat of 6 xwralAssemblyAeolutio=z" Some Conceptual Obser-
rations, 73 PROC. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW 324, 325-26 (1979).
